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« **The Crisis of Dual Governance in Higher Education and the Possibility of a New Rapprochement: Insights from Organization Theory** »

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THE CRISIS OF DUAL GOVERNANCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW RAPPROCHEMENT: INSIGHTS FROM ORGANIZATION THEORY

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ABSTRACT   In this paper I argue that traditional shared governance founders on universities' rapidly increasing organizational complexity and growing pressures to prove viable in a highly competitive environment. Faced with shrinking public support, a highly volatile resource environment, heightened competition from specialized niche-players, and higher and more differentiated constituency expectations, higher education administrators find it increasingly hard to maintain the kind of cooperation with faculty that shared governance would require. Faculty, for their part, increasingly withdraw into the narrow realm of activities they can control—their own teaching and research. To develop new organizational practices better aligned with evolving needs begins with understanding how collegial governance in its traditional form limits both administrators' central steering capacity and vigorous forms of faculty voice and citizenship. In this paper I draw on organization theory to outline the limits of traditional shared governance and suggest lines along which a new rapprochement might be possible.

RÉSUMÉ   Dans le présent article, est défendue l'idée que la gouvernance partagée selon le mode traditionnel se heurte au fait que les universités voient leur complexité organisationnelle croître rapidement et qu'elles subissent des pressions toujours plus fortes pour prouver leur viabilité dans un environnement hautement concurrentiel. Confrontés à une diminution du soutien public, à un accès aux ressources hautement volatil, à la compétition accrue livrée par les acteurs de créneaux spécialisés ainsi qu'aux attentes élevées et très variées de leurs mandants, les administrateurs en éducation supérieure trouvent de plus en plus difficile de maintenir la coopération entre universités exigée par la gouvernance partagée. De leur côté, les facultés se retirent toujours davantage dans le royaume restreint des activités qu'elles peuvent contrôler, leur enseignement et leur recherche. Pour développer de nouvelles pratiques organisationnelles qui répondent mieux aux besoins changeants des universités, il faut d'abord comprendre comment la gouvernance collégiale dans sa forme traditionnelle limite à la fois la capacité de pilotage des administrateurs et les possibilités pour les universités de s'exprimer et d'exercer leur engagement civique de façon vigoureuse. Cette contribution s'appuie sur la théorie organisationnelle pour déterminer les frontières de la gouvernance partagée selon le mode traditionnel et pour suggérer des pistes qui permettraient un rapprochement des parties.

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■ INTRODUCTION

Faced with shrinking public support, a highly volatile resource environment, and increasing constituency expectations, institutions of higher education have entered a period of organizational uncertainty. A shrinking support-base is juxtaposed to the need to expand their mission as they face greater demands from life-long learners, revenue conscious faculty entrepreneurs, and value-conscious clients. Yet, while focus and nature of many sectors of higher education are undergoing dramatic changes, its governance and decision-making structure largely continues in the traditional tracks of collegial shared governance (Hirsch and Weber, 2001; Mouwen, 2000; Hardy, 1996; Lewis and Altbach 1996; Dearlove 1998).

Senior academic leaders like long-time Cornell president Frank Rhodes (2001) have pointed to a lack of debate about whether the ancient academic governance arrangements continue to serve universities well. He maintains that universities are largely oblivious of efficiency concerns. James Duderstadt (2001), former President of the University of Michigan, alludes to the haphazard way in which universities tend to meet the demands for change in an essay entitled "Fire, Ready, Aim". He argued that the most important challenge for universities is to develop the capacity to change (Duderstadt and Womack, 2003).

In virtually all economically developed countries, universities are asked to arrive at new levels of accountability (Tremblay and Malsch, 2012), efficiency, entrepreneurial innovation, and flexibility (Gumport, 2001; Drucker, 1999; Clark, 1998; Clark, 2003). They are asked to improve their impact on societal problem-solving, to increase the quality of their teaching, to welcome non-traditional students and lead them to success, and to adapt to the de-centering of the university whose humanistic core is being replaced by an array of interdisciplinary research centers and professional schools (Brint, 2002). All the while universities are also supposed to increase their financial self-reliance, build a presence in an international market of teaching and learning, and respond creatively to changed economical, technical, and environmental opportunities and challenges. Also, the challenge of niche-specialization and the construction of profiles of selective excellence that all universities are faced with, takes place under conditions where actors and academic observers alike have only a vague understanding of the organizational and institutional mechanisms that constrain and enable strategic action of today's higher education administrators and policy makers.

Many observers have pointed out that resolving these problems of the new, entrepreneurial university might require large-scale organizational and cultural changes, including greater centralization and decentralization of decision-making; an increased degree of entrepreneurial behavior at all levels of the university (Zemsky, 2013; Clark, 1998; Norbach, 2000; Meyer, 2002c; Christensen and Eyring, 2011) as well as better alignment of performance and rewards, e.g. via performance-based incentives. But it is such changes that the university as an organization is particularly ill-equipped to handle. Morill (2010, p. 48), a former university president and philosophy professor, argued that the system of collegial governance works tolerably well under conditions of stability but "when pressures for change begin to mount, fault lines quickly appear in the system." Morrill suggests that collegial governance is ill-equipped to handle the new challenges. That form of governance is characterized by an "inability to address systematically and coherently the deepest and most comprehensive strategic challenges that confront an institution. Deep strategic questions of identity and purpose are always systemic and integrated, while the faculty committee structure is typically fragmented, complex and cumbersome" (p. 48).

In a book entitled "The Fall of the Faculty" Ben Ginsberg (2011) seeks an explanation for these changes in the self-interest of administrators. Ginsberg is taking a leaf from Parkinson's theorem of administrative bloat which Parkinson (1958) famously sees as that organizational tendency towards growth regardless of work load (Bergmann, 1991). And, in fact, the figures Ginsberg's provides are even more striking than Parkinson's analysis of the postwar growth of the British admiralty (table 1).

TABLE 1: CHANGES IN TEACHING AND NON-TEACHING STAFF SIZE, 1975-2005

	1975	2005	% Change
Full-time faculty	446,830	675,624	+51%
Administrators	102,465	190,078	+85%
Other professionals	166,487	566,405	+240%
Total non-teaching	268,952	756,483	+181%

Adapted from Ginsberg 2011, p. 25.

In the thirty years between 1975 and 2005 full-time teaching staff has grown by 51%, while non-teaching staff has increased by 181%.

Increased Faculty–Administration Conflict

In the face of these changes, universities find their traditional structures of collegial governance and decision-making severely tested. This traditional form of administration does not facilitate an effective response to the demands of accountability and economic sustainability. Where pro-active, forward-looking administrators try to introduce new managerial practices, (revising course requirements, fund-raising, finding or creating new audiences for teaching and research, and practices of continuous improvement and organizational learning) they seem to encroach on traditional faculty governance authority.

The stresses created by these unprecedented pressures for change show up in higher rates of conflict. Senates, the centerpiece of traditional shared governance models, have seen a decline in relevance across higher education. They have been sidelined, turned into consultative bodies, and even disbanded (e.g. Rensellaer Polytechnical Institute-RPI). Only in rare cases do they retain veto power (e.g. UC Berkeley). On unionized campuses (Rhoades 1998), conflict between the university faculty has also involved intensified adversity between unions and university administrators. Zemsky (2013) reports the case of the University of New Hampshire (UNH) where the faculty union was able to monopolize the faculty voice and block change by mobilizing a lot of ad hominem rhetoric.

Conflict between a "managerialist minded" university leadership and a "collegially minded" faculty need not result in open strive, but can equally (and equally detrimentally) produce faculty alienation or indifference.

Many observers explain these trends either in terms of increased "academic capitalism" or the rise of the "corporate university" (Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Marginson & Considine; Macfarlane 2012; Rolfe 2013). Zemsky (2013) suggests that part of the problem is that cosmopolitan professors have defected from their role as academic citizens, shunning academic duty in favor of more prestigious commitments to professional associations and

widely visible research. As the expectations vis-à-vis these professors' external engagements are ratcheted up, a growing lattice of administrative appointments is needed to compensate for the administrative desertion of faculty. Changing accentuation, Ginsberg (2011) sees administrator self-interest at fault.

One can accept both the selfish professor and the academic capitalism narrative as partial explanations for the changes we observe. A full picture, however, seems to me to require taking into account the far greater administrative complexity of the contemporary university compared to its predecessor of even 20 years ago (Meyer 2002b). That new organizational complexity confronts us with a new problem: how to go beyond traditional shared governance models to distribute intellectual and administrative leadership in ways that safeguards the intention of the shared governance idea.

In the next section I draw on organization theory to explore the limitations of dual governance under conditions of the entrepreneurial university and to suggest lines along which universities can evolve new hybrid forms of governance that may be better adapted to facilitate change while preserving and strengthening the role of faculty in governing the university.

▪ THE LIMITS OF DUAL GOVERNANCE IN THE ENTREPRENEURIAL UNIVERSITY

The two modes of university decision-making are executive decision-making at the senior administration level and collegial decision making at the department- and university-level (Bergquist 1992; Birnbaum 1998). Both are insufficient under conditions of large-scale change and university-wide mobilization. In the next section I argue that this standoff reflects deeper inherent problems of the dual governance model.

Limits of Collegial Decision-Making

Collegial decision-making involves professors who see themselves as independent operators. The time-honored mode of governance at universities, is based on the rejection of hierarchy (the president or dean is a primus inter pares), the rejection of professional expertise (professors are administrative dilettantes), and the rejection of the difference between decision-making and decision-execution. The faculty constitute a club which decides collectively about who to hire and fire; how to spend scarce resources; when and how to revise the curriculum, and when and how to implement whatever changes they agree on.

The standard for collegial decision-making is consensus. Since that is unrealistic as organizations grow more complex, professors have to resort to a number of decision short-cuts when consensus proves impossible or too arduous. Those short-cuts include:

- turf: defending narrow 'territorries' ("you stay out of my course / research area, I'll stay out of your's");
- quid-pro-quo / logrolling: ("I support your candidate if you support mine");
- paternalism: seniority rules.

All three of these traditional principles of academic self-government founder on the realities of modern university practice. Turf and log-rolling founder on the inter-disciplinary commitments of the complex university in which rigid boundaries of turf or rank are a serious obstacle, as rank founders on the fact ideas and initiative can come from anywhere

within the academy, and turf / logrolling represents intellectual protectionism at a time when interdisciplinary openness trumps.

Another feature of traditional collegial governance is the high-degree of reactivity (as opposed to pro-activity) and the sensitivity to chance factors. New initiatives, purchases, and plans more frequently are the result of accidentally coinciding events than of rational planning.

Organization theorists have described this mode of decision-making as "organized anarchy" or "garbage can" decision making (Cohen and March 1986). In this mode of governance participation is fluid, goals are ambiguous, and technologies are unclear. Decisions rarely derive from a rational search for optimal means to achieve preferred ends, but are driven by timing and coincidence or by the attempt to "find problems" that fit an available solution. In Cohen, March, and Olsen's classic account:

> ...one can view a choice opportunity as a garbage can into which various kinds of problems and solutions are dumped by participants as they are generated. The mix of garbage in a single can depends partly on the mix of cans available, the labels attached to the alternative cans; on what garbage is currently being produced and on the speed with which garbage is collected and removed from the scene." (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972: 2) "From this point of view, an organization is a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work (1972, p. 2).

Yet, the academy's anarchy is not entirely dysfunctional as it facilitates collegial freedom and autonomy. As the members of the collegium govern in accord with the unique rules governing higher education teaching and research they may reasonably resist efficiency-minded administrators. They may insist, for example, that popularity with students is not a perfect metric of good teaching; that reflection and inquiry often require an atmosphere that strikes outsiders as slow or wasteful; that it takes time and more than one iteration to develop a new course to its full potential; that the importance of a research project or a discovery cannot be measured by the funding it generates. Thus the collegium defends the academy against potentially arbitrary and coercive administrative interventions. This is their great and lasting achievement.

By diffusing power among the many stakeholders of a department or research institute, the collegial style ensures that individual professors are protected from coercion and the influence of factional interests.

Then why not leave everything to the slow meandering mode of collegial decision making? Because the collegium can also become invested in mandarin-style defenses if its own narrow self-interest, the price for which is status quo thinking and an anti-innovation attitude, as turfs are defended and thorough innovation rejected. The collegium lacks both resources and energy to see it through. In the words of Marginson and Considine, collegiality in practice all too often boils down to "obscure networks of 'god professors' dispensing 'grace and favour'" (2000, p. 116). And even where the faculty is finally resolved to innovate, they are notoriously weak at implementation and follow-through.

Limits of Centralized, Top-Down Decision-Making

The faculty's chronic weakness when it comes to devising and implementing long-term plans of action, seems to be the justification for a strong role of central administration (Kel-

ler 1983). But organizational analysis suggests that that mechanism, too, encounters difficulties, and not only due to the faculty's adversity. Ever since Weick's famous essay on loosely coupled organizations in education, the organizational literature is skeptical of the feasibility of tightly governing "loosely coupled organizations" (Weick 1976; Meyer 2002a).

> The president of a university is unable to evaluate whether the intellectual products of the faculty are worthwhile. The best research goes the way the researcher wants it to go. [...] Segments within the university decide key issues, such as teaching and admissions requirements, and the only control presidents have over these subgroups is money and financial approval of personnel decisions (Weick 2001).

In the context of colleges, strategic planning is even more difficult to develop if conceived as a fixed, analytical-based tool for steering the organization. Because positions and behaviors within higher education are loosely coupled, organizational members are less likely to follow a rational route with centralized objectives (Weick 1976). In higher education in particular we have:

- multiple constituencies;
- a plurality of goals;
- autonomy of key players, especially the faculty.

This plurality of goals, constituencies and technology makes loose coupling functional. In educational organizations each event or player can be linked by relatively weak connections that have a sense of "dissolvability and impermanence". The technical core is ambiguous and the authority of office is weak. The technical core comprises elements such as a type of "technology, task, subtask or role". The authority of office comprises "positions, offices, or responsibilities."

This imposes narrow limits on central planning and strategic management. As Mintzberg (1994) pointed out, higher education reveals an important problem of strategic management: the "intended" strategy is always distorted and changed by "emergent strategies" which are the result of the many uncoordinated "mini-strategies" pursued by individual faculty or departments. Rather than an order launched by a CEO, it is more realistic to think of strategy as a "stream of action" to which top management and the individual faculty are contributors.

"No amount of elaboration will ever enable formal procedures to forecast discontinuities, to inform managers who are detached from their operations, to create novel strategies. Ultimately, the term 'strategic planning' has proved to be an oxymoron" (Mintzberg 1994). Strategies is not a "plan", but an emergent response in facing changing environments. Mintzberg would suggest that "planning" - whether a unit or a process - should be supportive in providing inputs and encouraging strategic thinking across the organization, instead of making strategy a planning process.

■ THE UNIVERSITY AT RISK

In summary, I concur with Tierney and Holley (2005) and Rhoades (2005) that both collegial and administrative forms of governance are insufficient in light of the demands the university is exposed to. Having to manage with an ill-devised organizational structure puts the university at serious risk:

First, as the university's senior administration is called on to jump-start the transformation, there is a tendency to frame new initiatives as a top-down, administration-centered move. As a result of allocating many new competencies and senior staff at the central level, the university's top administration unwittingly monopolizes the momentum for change, without compensatory moves to decentralize and devolve authority and initiative. As the faculty is (or feels) sidelined, the new initiatives lack support and buy-in, and the transformation may get stuck.

Second, to develop new forms of cooperation between administration and faculty is difficult under traditional forms of academic governance, which give the faculty a strong voice in any change, without facilitating the growth of administrative expertise and competence that would be commensurate with that authority. As Clark (2003) has pointed out, the transformation rarely issues in structurally supported new forms of cooperation between administration and faculty.

Third: Without decentralizing the transformation process and mobilizing the faculty in departments, schools, and research centers, it is hard to move from merely cost cutting to value adding strategies. While central administrators can technically pursue cost cutting strategies unilaterally, the invention of value adding and market-expanding strategies depends on genuine involvement of the faculty and new forms of cooperation between administration and faculty.

Fourth: There is a grave risk of eroding the university's academic core by:

- weakening of the university's academic culture
- engendering conflict between 'market-proximate' and 'market-distant' academic fields
- creation of counterproductive incentives (judging a project by the money it brings in)
- neglect moral and ethical concerns of fairness and social justice in favor of new public-management quality-assessment auditing mechanisms, to assure "accountability" (e.g. Texas A&M's publishing a cost/benefit analysis of faculty members).

The Challenge

Yet, there is evidence that universities can no longer afford to accept weak coordination and strategic direction in the name of "loose coupling." While it may have sufficed until recently to change only in the face of overwhelming external pressure, today, universities must approach change in a self-directed, entrepreneurial fashion. External coercion comes way too late, and given the complexity of things, there is no reason to assume that the external change agent (government, trustees, donors) has a better understanding of the big picture than the university itself (Norback 2000).

If universities cannot be centrally managed even as increased accountability and strategic positioning are calling for increased strategic leverage, and if collegial governance lacks expertise, flexibility, and incentives, new forms of governance must be found that can integrate the needs of faculty, senior administration, and outside sponsors.

■ **TOWARDS A NEW RAPPROCHEMENT?**

The coincidence of a nominally persisting traditional governance structure with the pressure to behave more entrepreneurially and flexibly has, to date, produced a standoff, if not outright conflict, between administration and faculty. A typical pattern is a more pro-active and expansive administration, countered by a retarding and resisting faculty. Faculty for their part feel that they have neither the qualification nor the inclination to become involved in administrative reforms. They prefer to draw a high wall of separation between their research and teaching on the one hand and the administration on the other—and be hell well left alone behind it.

In this section I want to suggest a few lines along which this standoff can be overcome.

Academics can agree to the need for greater administrative efficiency, professionalism, and entrepreneurialism.

Administrators can agree to the need to protect the academic core, foster flexible cooperation, and facilitate a stronger faculty voice in the academy.

What is needed are new practices and structures of governance which integrate the needs of faculty, senior administration, and outside sponsors, and better tap the faculty's expertise and its ability to take responsibility for administrative outcomes. Finally, a key challenge is to allow the university to gain or regain a coherent culture, to integrate its multiple goals and far-flung purposes and mold its diverse members into a minimally cohesive community.

■ **THREE CHANGES THAT ADMINISTRATORS NEED AND THAT FACULTY CAN SUPPORT**

Higher Standards of Efficiency

In many universities the traditional "committee" still defines accepted standards of collegial governance and administrative efficiency. When it comes to committees the amateur professor-administrators who normally guard their time jealously accept the wasteful use that many academic committees make of the time of highly paid, highly educated professionals, indicative of a sadly low aspiration level as far as efficient and effective administration are concerned. There is no consequence to showing up unprepared to a committee meeting, or to launch into long monologues founded on ignorance. Nor would the committee that executes its work poorly expect to pay a price. All decisions—in matters large or small, momentous or trivial—are made by committees which "keep minutes and lose hours," as the standard refrain among faculty goes.

One way to approach this problem may be by distinguishing between problems that require collegial versus those that benefit from a faculty-directed managerial approach (Bensimon and Neumann 1994).

For example, currently, the selection of members to a committee is typically "merit or qualification-blind," based on the principle of "unit representation" which is intended to insure that each academic unit has "their" representative at the table. As a result, many

committee members assume a spectator role, reporting back whatever happened at a meeting made up of other spectators. The reticence of the many often makes room for the activism of the self-selected few—faculty who take an interest in the subject for one reason or another and who often meet few obstacles in pursuing their well- or ill-considered agenda. Add to this the two-year turnover rule according to which committee members don't serve for more than two years on the same committee, and you have a recipe for dilettantism. Expertise is not allowed to accumulate and where it does it is treated with indifference.

In many such cases, committees might be beneficially supported or supplanted by teams (Meyer and Kalayeros 2005). Teams consists of individuals deliberately selected for their matching skills and social compatibility. Unlike committees, they are charged with a specific mission. Their smaller size makes them more nimble, while their shared mission and matching skills make them more effective.

Greater Professionalism

While administration at the senior leadership and dean level of most large universities has become professionalized, these changes have not trickled down to the departments where much of the university's day-to-day administrative work is carried out. Almost all professors double as amateur-administrators—personnel manager, public relations officer, entrepreneur, program evaluator, accountant, and marketing expert—without being trained or experienced in any of these activities. Departments are managed by academics who moonlight as administrative professionals. Professor-turned-deans take on the role of chief executive of sizable organizations often with only scant knowledge of the organizational, managerial, and financial aspects of their job.

This explains in large part why universities, despite countless committees and councils that try to make decisions, are chronically weak at implementing them. This was not much of a problem as long as the majority of decisions concerned matters like academic degree policies, which merely had to be made public to the students. But today decisions, even on the department or school-level, require extensive operations—networking, recruiting, negotiating, reorganization, marketing, real time data management, accounting, and management—to be implemented. This calls for technical and professional staff beyond the amateur-chair which a faculty cognizant of the new needs of higher educational administration can appreciate and support (Hecht et al. 1999).

More Entrepreneurialism

Faced with these new pressures, universities have begun to adapt. In their excellent study of the changes taking place in Australia, Marginson and Considine (2000) report that virtually all Australian universities have adapted their administrative structures to improve their entrepreneurialism and competitiveness. A survey of relevant initiatives would include recruiting star faculty; reconfiguring research into 'market-proximate' clusters; introducing differential tuition; partnering with industry; supporting grant writing; expanding distance learning; refocusing teaching and research programs; creating new (interdisciplinary) programs; conducting new funding campaigns; introducing performance sensitive rewards (financial and symbolic), to mention a few.

Although often eyed skeptically by faculty, many of these initiatives are, in and of themselves, not necessarily pernicious. Nor are they inherently new. They have been practiced

by university administrators for many decades. What is often new is the frequency with which they are employed and, perhaps, the low degree of faculty input in their design. A faculty cognizant of the changing landscape in higher education can see them as legitimate needs of an administration that is trying to insure a university's long-term viability.

■ THREE CHANGES TO STRENGTHEN THE ACADEMIC CORE THAT ADMINISTRATORS CAN SUPPORT

Higher standards of administrative efficiency, professionalism, and entrepreneurialism can be thought of as 'concessions' a newly reflective faculty can make to the demands of the new university. The following three features—protecting the academic core, finding new forms of flexible cooperation, and a strengthened faculty voice—can conversely be thought of as duties of senior administrators cognizant of the legitimate demands of the faculty.

Protecting and Strengthening the Academic Core

Administration must realize that there is a gravitational pull on the university away from its traditional center, lodged in the humanities, and towards applied sciences and the professions, which are more market proximate, and more easily monetized. And while measured growth in these areas does not threaten the university's academic culture, a slow thinning out of the traditional core does.

What is perhaps even more pernicious is an administration that allows the standards of academic success to be increasingly defined in terms of a research project's financial and grant-getting potential whereby scholarly achievements are predominantly measured in the hard coin of research dollars.

As that benchmark becomes widely accepted, the university becomes an increasingly inhospitable place for historians, philosophers, and other humanities scholars who only paper and pencil for their work.

Another trend that, if unchecked, can erode the university's academic core is shifting the control over testing and grading away from faculty and place it in the hands of outside, often for-profit 'vendors'. Administrators should be expected to commit to fending off ill-advised "accountability schemes" that assess the 'value-added' of courses by the results of externally designed standardized tests. As such testing and accountability measures proliferate, the professoriate loses control of testing and grading—and with that an important voice of influence in the university.

Protecting the academic core means for administrators to realize that, in today's climate, they need to swim against the current of monetizing and vocationalizing higher education even to maintain the status quo. This also includes strong measures to guarantee continued faculty involvement in designing and redesigning the curriculum (see below).

Flexible Cooperation: Institutionalize Faculty-Administration Cooperation

The disconnect between decision-making and implementation is also caused by an imbalance between authority and responsibility. While the faculty see themselves as center of authority in the academic environment, they are used to leave responsibility for implementation to the administration. This gap between the sayers and the doers pervades the uni-

versity. The two camps need to come together on a regular basis and jointly solve problems and oversee their implementation if we want to see greater mutual understanding. A step in the right direction are the executive councils that some universities have installed, which bring together faculty representatives and senior administrators on a regular basis. Likewise, a smaller senate would help transform the senate from a debating to a working entity, which is less vulnerable to the kind of paralysis that any obstinate individual armed with *Robert's Rule* can visit on them.

Another move that will make it easier for faculty and administrators to engage in honest dialogue may be to facilitate the crossover from faculty to administrator and back. Under current conditions whereby academics serve for one term of administrative service there is very little organizational learning. The faculty-turned-administrators retire without feeding the knowledge they have gained back to the organization. Some universities have begun experimenting with 'faculty fellows'—professors who are tapped for, say, a two-year rotation for their administration-relevant skills. The goal is to provide a platform to bring faculty expertise into the day-to-day governing of the university on a regular basis. Fellows may receive a small stipend or a reduced teaching load. Similarly, the process of curriculum innovation could be supported via innovation fellowships where faculty compete for teaching sabbaticals to revamp a course or create a new course.—Although best practice examples are few, changes along these lines are certainly not utopian as the example of Murdoch University in Australia shows (Currie, 2005).

A Strengthened Faculty Voice

Replacing or complementing traditional committees with a mix of ad hoc working groups and informal consultations at the initiative of senior administrators will leave some uneasy about a lack of faculty opportunities to articulate ideas and suggestions not anticipated by the university's executive leaders—and rightly so. What is missing is the creation of protected spaces for inter-faculty and inter-departmental collegial reflection and consultation, institutional arenas to facilitate informal collegial reflection that would help faculty discover that certain problems are collective or institutional in nature. Indeed, outside the senate (with its stiff constraints on informality) today's university does not offer spaces for inter-collegial deliberation and reflection.

To create the needed space senior faculty leaders (e.g. previous department chairs) could be tapped to head, say, a leadership brain-storming group (e.g. a "faculty leadership college") to facilitate the exchange of administrative expertise which could bring together faculty with administrative experience, as well as novice faculty-administrators who might find it useful for mentoring services.

Some also suggest the inclusion of faculty representatives on the board of trustees (Ginsberg, 2012). The same end could be served by establishing regular faculty—trustee dialogue.

■ NEEDED: HONEST DIALOGUE TO STRENGTHEN THE CULTURE OF THE ACADEMY

Needless to say, structural changes alone won't solve the problem which requires the change of deeply ingrained cultural beliefs. Professors find it difficult to think of themselves

as competitors, entrepreneurs, and market players. In their self-concept the progress of discovery is driven by intellectual merit and scholarship, not politics or resources. That mind-set is reinforced by the different rhythm of faculty and administrator work. While the latter complete their work in daily and weekly cycles, the cycle-time of scholars is months and years. While administrators operate pragmatically, open to risk, the exacting standards of academic rigor discourage compromise and eschew risk. Unless these beliefs are replaced by a new narrative of revitalized faculty leadership and entrepreneurial change, any successful structural changes are likely to be neutralized by an inert culture.

None of the above will happen unless the tradition of hyperbole, and 'ad hominem' is replaced by a new honesty in the dialogue between administration and faculty. Here is an example of the kind of standoffish attitudes that have often hampered progress on both sides.

> …called to discuss curriculum developments, the dean of the faculty stressed the need to develop courses that would attract overseas and local fee-paying students since university finances depended upon expanding those numbers. I [a professor of ethics, hdm] responded with a speech in which I suggested that in a world beset with environmental problems, political conflicts, and the clash of civilizations it might be more important to prepare students for leadership roles that would be sensitive to the needs of others and to the demands of cultural tolerance. The dean replied that the university is not funded for that (quoted in Macfarlane, 2012, p. 129).

This seems to me to epitomize the kind of 'talking-past-each-other' that turns a solvable problem into a quagmire. The dean begins by framing the problem of adapting the curriculum in commercial terms only. The faculty replies by insisting on the educational and moral responsibilities of the university, followed by another reference to financial constraints.

With a bit of reflection it is easy to realize that not only do both have a point, but their points are reconcilable! The dean's move could be more fully framed as pointing to the need to make the university more sensitive to globalization and more welcoming for an internationally diverse student body, a corollary of which would be increased enrolment. The professor's point could be restated to provide added insight about the ecological, political, and moral dimension of globalization that the new courses should address.

The administration of a university has been likened to steering a skidding automobile on ice. Most academics understand that the rules of the game are changing. At stake is the emerging face of higher education. While we must remain true to the university's special character as an organization of equals engaged in an unpredictable voyage of discovery following peer-defined standards of rigor, we must be no less rigorous in holding academics to high standards of efficiency where the nature of the task allows and demands it.

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